

Russian Consumers in the Globalised World: A Case Study of the Fashion and Apparel Industry[†]

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Abstract: This study aims to evaluate state policy from a consumer standpoint, consumption trends, and companies' correspondence regarding them, with a focus on the fashion and apparel industry. Regarding consumers' attitudes, Russian consumers demand high-quality and trendy designs like consumers in developed countries. Russian companies, which should respond to consumers, follow foreign companies by outsourcing their production to Asian countries to win a cost competition with global leaders. This can be seen as the true result of globalisation.

In contrast, the government promoted an inward-looking economic policy after sanctions and the 2014 economic crisis, and sometimes employs heavy-handed measures. However, these government policies have not achieved significant results so far and do not strongly affect the behaviour of consumers and business, because both Russian consumers and companies are deeply incorporated into the global economy and benefit from it.

Keywords: consumer, fashion industry, globalisation, import-substituting industrialisation

JEL Classification Numbers: L67, M14, O57, P52

1. Introduction

Russia's economic crisis that started in 2014 has not been very serious but it has been more prolonged than the 2008 crisis (Figure 1). Although the economy saw growth from 2016, the real GDP growth rate is not anticipated to be as high as it was in the 2000s for the time being. Regarding the influence on people's lives, real disposable income and household final consumption expenditure decreased from 2013 to 2018, by 7.8% and 4.0%, respectively.

The most important factor of this crisis was the drop in the international crude oil price. Russia's GDP growth rate and oil price are definitely strongly correlated.¹ Russia also faced economic sanctions from the US and EU countries and opposite sanctions after the Crimea unification. These sanctions/opposite sanctions initially deteriorated the financial conditions of giant state-owned companies, and it now seems that the current sanctions are a serious and long-term phenomenon.² Furthermore, since the rate of economic growth was slowing even before the crisis, others argue that the problem is the economic structure itself.³ For example, Kudrin and Gurvich (2015)⁴ claimed that 'the imported growth model' depended on the export of resources and the funds derived from them met a limit. Mau (2019)⁵ argued that the dynamics of growth in 2010–2014 were stimulated by the growth in household demand and wages,

whereas those in 2016–2019 were based on the production sector, both of which were closely related to government policy.

Figure 1. Russia's real GDP growth rate



Source: Author's calculation based on Rosstat data.

Under this stagnation, the Russian government introduced a measure for promoting domestic industries; it tried to centralise investment in manufacturing through policies such as subsidiaries, credit offerings, limiting the domestic product of state procurement,⁶ and encouraging exports. Additionally, the government strongly promoted import-substituting industrialisation; it adopted supportive plans for import-substitution in industries and agriculture in 2014⁷ with the aim of reinforcing competitiveness, including increasing exports.⁸ Based on the impact of such policies, government officials such as Medvedev (2016) insisted on reinforcing competitiveness in the international market.⁹ Many studies have argued about the validity of these policies overall or their practical effectiveness in the industry. For example, Zagashvili (2016)¹⁰ focused on the fact that Russia has been deeply incorporated into the global economy and raised doubts regarding the policies' effects. In addition, many have argued that it is impossible to develop manufacturing without import facilities because the technical and industrial bases in Russia cannot meet international standards.¹¹ In fact, the share of manufacturing in Russia's total investments decreased from 15.2% in 2015 to 13.0% in 2017, and innovation activity remained at a low level.¹²

Compared with the abundant arguments on the effect of the government policy on business, scant attention has been paid to consumer responses to such measures. However, government policies such as import bans and import-substitution industrialisation affect consumers both directly and indirectly. How do consumers view these policies and what kind of influence do they have on consumers? Do consumers choose domestic products in support of their government's foreign policies? Are consumers' choices

independent and economically rational? The purpose of this study is to answer these questions temporarily—i.e. to evaluate state policy from a consumer standpoint.

To study consumers' attitudes, a consumer ethnocentrism approach—a business study field—can provide hints;¹³ however, while leaving such a study to the future, this paper observes how consumers change through a market. We examine consumption trends and companies' correspondence for them, mainly through a marketing research group report.

Here, we limit our discussion to the fashion and apparel industry because people's consumption trends have direct effects on this field. This industry has a considerable share among family budget consumption and high income elasticity; therefore, the analysis of this market might let us know consumers' preferences to some degree.¹⁴

However, as is clear from the above-mentioned arguments about the cause of the crisis, one difficulty in this analysis is dividing up various factors such as the Russian market condition, the economic crisis, and reactions to government policies. The overall economic conditions and government policies are closely tied to consumers' conditions and purchasing behaviour. As such, we will try to examine how these factors are distributed, as follows: we will examine consumers' general trends in Section 2 and consumers' reactions to economic crises in Section 3. After having examined consumers' preferences for goods made in Russia in Section 4, we will focus on the influence of economic sanctions and import-substituting industrialisation in Section 5.

2. Consumers' general trends

Modern consumers have a new sense of value, which we can summarise as consisting of three tendencies: diversification, independence, and individualisation.¹⁵

Regarding diversification, new consumption forms such as reuse and sharing are emerging in Russia, though the image of a pawnshop or 'commission' under the Soviet Union has remained strong.¹⁶ Besides, interest in the environment is also increasing and the term 'slow fashion' is becoming popular as an antithesis to 'fast fashion' in Russia.

Independence means that the range of consumers' independent decisions is widening due to easy access to information. The proportion of clothing purchases over the Internet is still 8.5%; however, the market size is about 200 billion roubles, the largest behind household appliances, and the ratio in the electronic commerce (EC) market is around 20–22%. The Russian EC market grows annually by up to 7–9% and the number of fashion-related online shops has tended to increase.¹⁷ In addition, the influence of the Internet does not remain for the use of online shops. Before purchasing products in real shops, people do online research via Twitter and Instagram, which contributes to consumers' purchasing decisions.¹⁸

Individualisation refers to product customisation and service personalisation. The president of *Romir* suggested that as smartphones spread, the usability of applications and customised services depending on personal preferences and demand are becoming key to sales for many brands.¹⁹ In addition, the influence

of religion and race is increasing: for example, luxury brands now offer hijabs.

These three trends exist internationally and are infiltrating the Russian market via globalisation and the spread of information technology (IT). Russian consumers, primarily young people, proactively absorb new, rapidly progressing technology such as IT and have developed a sense of value similar to that in developed countries. Namely, Russian consumers benefit from globalisation.

In response to the diversification of such consumers, business strategies are also diversifying. Major Russian fashion companies adopted the fast fashion business model long ago, probably because this business model started to emerge across the world just after the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s and the price range was at a level that most Russian consumers and companies preferred at that time. However, businesses have started targeting different markets in recent years, such as by providing products with unique designs and mid-price range products. For example, the Russian apparel company BAON is increasing its production of down jackets in Russia and Belarus, targeting a price range slightly above fast fashion.²⁰ The company's strategy is not to offer a universal product but instead to move to target an original item that matches Russian preferences and lifestyles. The general director of the Fashion Consulting Group, Lebsak-Kleimans, explained the advantage of Russian companies, saying that Russian 'producers know more about customers, their tastes, and features of their figures.'²¹ The improvement of large-size items is also an important strategy in Russia.

3. Influence of the crisis

As can be seen from the above, real disposable income and household final consumption expenditure decreased after the economic crisis (also see Figure 2). According to the private research centre *Romir*, although people had already stopped cutting down their food expenses, the influence of the crisis was still strong in the clothing market.²² As shown in Figure 3, this market suffered a huge reduction in 2015 and has only recently recovered to its 2012 level (Figure 3).²³

The main methods include postponing purchases, switching to low-priced brands, and shopping during sales.


First, Russian consumers spent up to 8–10% of their disposable income on clothes 10 years ago, whereas the share of spending had decreased to 3–4%. Moreover, about two-thirds of Russians economised after the economic crisis in 2015; 69% saved on apparel and shoes.²⁴ Only 17% of people actually bought clothes in 2015, and this rose to 38% in 2016.²⁵

Second, the Fashion Consulting Group's research showed that 76% of respondents were looking for low-priced brands, which also reflects the market share and firms' business results.²⁶ While the high-price range remained at about 10% of the market, the low-price range increased from 51% in 2014 to 65% in 2018 and the mid-price range decreased from 39% to 24% (Figure 4).²⁷

Another change was consumers' use of sales. The percentage of consumers looking for sales was 36% in 2017, 10 points higher than in 2016,²⁸ which means that consumers' behaviour remained unchanged


even after the crisis. Most (72%) consumers checked brands' homepages before making purchases, >50% performed social networking site searches, and impulse buying decreased.²⁹

Figure 2. Russian real disposable income and household final consumption expenditure (year-to-year comparison, %)



Source: Author's calculation based on Rosstat data.

Figure 3. Fashion industry market volume (billion roubles)




Source: Author's calculation based on Fashion Consulting Group data.

Under such income and consumption stagnation, contradictory responses were seen in businesses'

pricing strategies. One response was to maintain or reduce prices to secure a market share, resulting in a $\leq 30\%$ reduction for individual items. Another was to increase prices in accordance with inflation, the average of which was 10–15%. It was easy for giant foreign companies to take the former strategy because the influence of exchange rate fluctuations became negligible. For example, the share of Russian business in H&M was only 2.7%.³⁰ Thus, the growth rate of foreign companies from 2013 through to 2016 was 28%, whereas that of Russian companies was only 14%. The difference in this pricing strategy converged once in 2016 but was observed again in 2017–2018. In late years the large companies increased their ratio of lower-priced products and reduced those of higher-priced ones while extending the volume of basic items to the maximum.

Figure 4. Price range distribution in the Russian apparel market (%)



Source: Fashion Consulting Group (2017); *Ekonomika i zhizn'*, 6th June 2019, p. 22.

Table 1. Ranks and shares of apparel companies in 2016.

Rank	Company	Sales (10 billion roubles)	Market share (%)
1	Inditex	69.2	3
2	O'stin	35.8	1.6
3	Gloria Jeans	34	1.5
4	H&M	29.8	1.3
5	Kari	29.2	1.3
...			
27	Fast Retailing	6.4	0.3

Source: *Vedomosti*, 18th October 2017. Original data source: Fashion Consulting Group.

In addition, with the fixation of the use of sales as a background, companies take the strategy to bring

about a fair-priced feeling; companies slightly raise their initial setting price and put active reductions in price for the sale period.³¹


Table 1 shows the market share of major companies in the apparel industry. Judging from the 2016 sales figures, the scale of the Inditex, which has brands such as Zara, Pull & Bear, Bershka, Oysho, and Massimo Dutti, stands out. Most of Inditex's brands are in the mid-price range, which shows a declining share in Figure 4; however, the company could maintain an overwhelming market share by using one of the above-mentioned pricing strategies.³²

4. Preference for goods made in Russia


The textile and garment industries were not on a stable growth path in this quarter-century (see Figure 5). This slump can be explained by the following factors: dependency on imported raw materials, aging equipment, and low management quality, all of which have resulted in low competitiveness in the market. These factors have been used to demonstrate the failure of Russian industry since the collapse of the Soviet Union.³³

Consequently, even though the fall of the currency might have strengthened Russian companies' international competitiveness, production recovery in Russian light industries is more difficult. Overall productivity and quality are so low that they have eviscerated the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on price competitiveness.³⁴

Figure 5. Dynamics of textile and sewing industries (1991=100)



Source: Author's calculation based on data from Rosstat.

Figure 6. Real production of fabric (m²)

Source: Author's calculation based on data from Rosstat.

According to Figure 6, fabric production has recently been restored; however, this is in large part due to the increase in chemical and non-woven fabric, which was not included in these statistics until 2009.³⁵ Besides, there has been an increase in the production of special fireproof or waterproof fabric for uniforms.³⁶ This can be regarded as a shift to high-value-added products; however, the demand for these textiles mainly comes from public organisations. The consumption of gauze and other medical cloth has also grown due to government-led programs. Therefore, it cannot be concluded from these data that the private consumption of textiles or clothing made in Russia has increased.

However, the following should be added.

First, Russian companies must pay more attention to catching up with developed countries by acquiring management with the highest production and distribution skills. Moving the production base to Asia, like world-leading brands, is one result of these efforts. A large proportion of the finished or half-finished goods in the fashion industry come from abroad and this can be seen as the true result of globalisation, from which businesses profit.³⁷

Besides, as another result of Russian companies' efforts, even though the gap between Russian companies and global leading companies still exists, the differences between them in terms of product prices and quality are decreasing. Russian consumers have also started to pay more attention to domestic products and evaluate their quality.³⁸ According to the newspaper company RKB,³⁹ only 3.3% of respondents stated that they only bought foreign clothes, while 51% admitted that 'there are excellent brands in Russia'.

Of course, trust in Russian brands and designers does not necessarily lead to trust in Russian products.

The famous Russian designer Akhmadullina said that her ‘company would like to produce a part of assortments at the Russian factory, but so far China has the advantage. Chinese experts completely outrank on accessories, materials, components. ... Doing this in Russia is more expensive, more difficult and requires additional efforts from her team.’⁴⁰

Second, some companies are dramatically increasing their domestic production under such conditions. This is partly due to the introduction of modern facilities and production site automation, which cannot be explained solely by short-term trends such as falls in the exchange rate or sanctions. This is derived from logistical advantages (i.e. being near the market). Companies such as Faberlic and Gloria Jeans identify short delivery dates and flexibility of correspondence as merits of production in Russia. For example, Gloria Jeans allocates work that must be performed immediately prior to a season and high-value-added individual work to Russia because the process from dyeing to delivery takes at least two months in Asia, whereas it takes only four to five days in Rostov-on-Don. This allows the company to present items in stores in just two weeks.⁴¹ These companies are making large investments in automation and introducing updated software in Russia,⁴² which indicates that they see Russia as a logistics base in the medium and long term. The development of production bases in both Russia and Asia is evidence that these companies include Russia in their global value chain arena.

5. Economic sanctions and import-substituting industrialisation

Russia’s isolation (anti-globalisation) from the global community was reinforced after 2014. Having suffered economic sanctions, the Russian government adopted policies of import-substituting industrialisation and encouraging exports, taking advantage of the weak rouble and expecting the Russian manufacturing industry to improve. To encourage domestic production, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade launched the ‘Made in Russia’ project in 2014 and set up an organisation called ‘Russian Quality’ by government order No. 780-R in 2015 to manage the ‘Made in Russia’ trademark.

However, consumers’ general direct reaction to embargos by the Russian government is considerably negative. The following is an example of the general survey results when the additional import prohibition of farm products, raw materials, alcohol, cigarettes, and medicine was argued in 2018. Forty-two percent were critical of the embargo on alcohol, while 29% answered ‘I do not know’. Of the critical respondents, 42% were worried about the emergence of poor-quality products or forgeries, 34% about price increases of domestic products or inflation, and 34% about choice limitations.⁴³

Then, in the fashion industry, a program for developing light industries (2016–2025) plans to lower the import ratio from 75% to 70% and to increase exports from 79 to 154 billion roubles.⁴⁴

The Russian government forbade companies in the textile or light industries that receive national budgetary funds from buying imported goods when it carried out state procurement. Furthermore, the government gave big companies preferential treatment to use social insurance funds to purchase clothes produced in the Eurasian Economic Union. As a result, domestic companies got a 15% advantage in price

competition compared to overseas producers and the Ministry of Industry and Trade reported that the ratios of Russian textiles for state procurement from state-owned companies increased from 35% in 2015 to 62% in 2018. However, state procurement of workers' clothing or uniforms tends to concentrate on specific companies,⁴⁵ so this policy only matters to a few companies.

In addition, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade has approached foreign firms with production facilities in Russia. In spring 2016, the ministry suggested that the Spanish Inditex and Swedish H&M and IKEA place orders with Russian companies or construct factories in Russia; reportedly, although these foreign firms initially showed interest in this suggestion, no concrete agreements were made.

Under such circumstances, 'Russian Quality' in affiliation with the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade claimed in 2017 that Zara's underwear was harmful to health and did not meet the technical requirements of the Eurasian Economic Union. After stating that Zara could do nothing but suspend the sales of their products, in the same interview, a ministry official suggested that he was ready to discuss the problem of local production in Russia with Inditex management.⁴⁶ Finally, in July 2018, Inditex reached an agreement with the Russian factory 'Morozov Traditions' in the Tver region to produce hats and scarves under the Zara brand.⁴⁷ Then, in August, the Ministry of Industry and Trade offered Russian companies in the Permi region partnerships with Inditex. The potential production partners had to meet certain conditions such as a production capacity of 7,000 units per month and the products would be sold marked 'Made in Russia' in Russia and other countries; these movements suggest that the government placed strong pressure on foreign companies.

Another example is the government's support for designers in the expectation that they would use materials made in Russia and invigorate the manufacturing industry; although they do receive subsidies, designers claim that it is hard to obtain high-quality textiles given Russia's present conditions.⁴⁸ Gurova and Morozova (2018)⁴⁹ claimed that creative entrepreneurs show general mistrust towards the state, although this does not mean that they will not accept any help from the state.

The Russian government is encouraging people's patriotism through the 'Made in Russia' campaign and import-substituting industrialisation program.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, consumers have rarely mentioned unconditional 'preferences' for domestic products or 'ejection' movements of foreign goods so far. Neither consumers nor businesses were the main anti-reform forces for globalisation in Russia. Given that Russian companies and consumers benefit from globalisation, anti-globalism will not increase significantly, even if nationalistic tendencies increase to some extent among authorities.

However, a change in consumers' minds may have occurred recently (in around 2018) because the patriotic tendency of Russian consumers was pointed out by some experts. The general director of the Fashion Consulting Group, Lebsak-Kleimans, focused on this situation, generalising that consumers 'are willing to spend money on what they think about more rationally.... This is local production: people think they will not overpay for transportation, taxes and foreign labour'. The rapid growth of a specific Russian company (O'stin) may also be related to this change. We should examine this in detail in the future.

6. Conclusion

Although the saving habits initiated in a time of economic crisis still remain among Russian consumers, they demand high-quality and trendy designs, like consumers in developed countries with high information literacy. In particular, the younger generations (generations Y and Z) are sensitive to global trends⁵¹ and the global fast fashion brands are as popular as ever among them. Moreover, there has been a change in their sense of value, which also mimics the global trend.

Russian companies are strongly interested in the highest production and management technologies. Many companies follow foreign companies by outsourcing their production to Asian countries to win a cost competition with global leaders. Although aggressive companies incorporate Russia into their global value chain strategy and some of them have increased domestic production, the comparative disadvantage of domestic production will not change in the short term.

In summary, Russian consumers and businesses, which should respond to consumers, are receiving the benefits of globalisation.

In contrast, the government promoted an inward-looking economic policy after sanctions and the 2014 economic crisis, and sometimes employs heavy-handed measures. Without mentioning the validity of individual measures here, we have confirmed that these government policies have not achieved significant results so far and have not strongly affected the behaviour of consumers and businesses. Rather, both Russian consumers and companies are deeply incorporated into the global economy and benefit from it, and the Russian fashion industry is developing while facing diversification and complexity under the power of globalisation.⁵²

Notes

¹ There is plenty of literature on this topic. For example, see Ulyukaev and Mau (2015).

² The impact of the sanctions was so severe that the government was forced to compensate big companies for the damage. The prolongation of the sanctions is characterised as the ‘stabilisation of the sanction regime’. Ershov (2016).

³ Tabata (2016) also emphasised that the Russian economic growth model based on the high price of crude oil already ended in 2013, and it could not do any more than get out of the way of the import-substituting model. In his opinion, the economic sanctions just support the change for this course.

⁴ Kudrin and Gurvich (2015).

⁵ Mau (2019).

⁶ This policy increases costs for companies. *Vedomosti*, 19th April 2019, p. 4.

⁷ The legal basics are as follows: Rasporyazhenie Pravitel'stva RF, No. 1936-p on 30.09.2014, Ob utverzhdenii plana sodeistviya importozameshcheniyu v promyshlennosti; Rasporyazhenie Pravitel'stva

RF, No. 1948-p on 02.10. 2014, Ob utverzhdenii plana meropriyatii po sodeistviyu importozameshcheniyu v sel'skom khozyaistve na 2014-2015 gg. The words 'import-substituting industrialisation' disappeared from President Order No. 204 on 07.05.2018, Ob natsional'nykh tselyakh i strategicheskikh zadachakh razvitiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2024 goda.

⁸ One characteristic of the Russian import-substituting policy is that it includes the increase of exports.

⁹ Medvedev (2016).

¹⁰ Zagashvili (2016) calls such a strategy 'forced' import substitution; also see Afontsev (2015).

¹¹ For example, Mironov (2019); Bazhanov and Oreshko (2019); Institut statisticheskikh issledovaniy i ekonomiki znaniy (2018, available at <https://issek.hse.ru/press/218573766.html>, accessed 27th April 2019.).

¹² Bazhanov (2019).

¹³ The following works discussed consumer ethnocentrism in Russia but regarding different concerns: Good and Huddleston (1995); Durvasula, Andrews, and Netemeyer (1997); Klein, Ettenson, and Krishnan (2006).

¹⁴ Furthermore, although we have mainly examined clothing, the fashion industry consists of clothing, shoes, and accessories. The share of clothing, shoes, and accessories in the fashion industry is 61.4%, 28.8%, and 9.8%, respectively. *Vedomosti*, 20th July 2018, p. 15.

¹⁵ This categorisation was derived from the Fashion Consulting Group (2017).

¹⁶ *Vedomosti*, 5th December 2018, p. 11.

¹⁷ Fashion Consulting Group (2017).

¹⁸ Regarding the characteristics of youths in particular, see the website of Young Space (<https://youngspace.ru/>). The pages are filled with words such as 'blogger' and 'influencer'.

¹⁹ In reality, it is impossible for companies to treat every customer individually and it cannot help but become 'mass personalisation'. Romir, Rossiiskoe obshchestvo: krizis, stabil'nost' ili stagnatsiya? available at: <https://romir.ru/news/rossiyskoe-obshchestvo-krizis-stabilnost-ili-stagnatsiya>, accessed 27th April 2019.

²⁰ Author's interview with the product director, Anna Sirotkina, in September of 2017.

²¹ *Ekspert*, No. 5, January 29, 2018, p. 32.

²² *Ekonomika i Zhizn'*, No. 19, May 18, 2018, p. 4. The RLMS HSE data also provides abundant information about the consumption and financial behaviour of Russian family, however, the analysis of this database lies outside the scope of this paper.

²³ The market size was 2.36 billion roubles in 2018. *Kommersant*, No. 236(6474), December 21, 2018, p. 9.

²⁴ Fashion Consulting Group (2017).

²⁵ It is not possible to specify the percentage of people who do not save from this list due to the multiple answers. Romir, *Luchshaya strategiya ekonomiki— okhota za skidkami*, available at: http://romir.ru/studies/940_1500498000/, accessed 27th April 2019.

- ²⁶ *Ekspert*, No. 18, 1st May 2017, pp. 21–27.
- ²⁷ Interestingly, the increase in the sales of high-quality articles after 2016 (Burberry 16%, Tiffany & Co 19%, Bvlgari 64%) was strongly attributed to travellers, mainly Chinese. *Vedomosti*, 16th November 2018, p. 13.
- ²⁸ Based on interviews with 1,500 people over 18 years old living in cities or rural villages. Romir, *Luchshaya strategiya ekonomiki– okhota za skidkami*, available at: http://romir.ru/studies/940_1500498000/, accessed 27th April 2019.
- ²⁹ Fashion Consulting Group (2017). The percentages of Internet and social network users vary by investigation.
- ³⁰ H&M (2019), p. 17. The number of stores is 139, having increased by 5 in 2018. Inditex had 547 shops in Russia, third only to (7.3% in share) Spain and China as of 31st January 2018. Their contribution to profits before taxes was only 3.5%. Inditex (2019).
- ³¹ *Kommersant*, No. 93(6331), 31st May 2018, p. 10.
- ³² O'stin, the second-place company in 2016 sales, is a relatively new Russian company (from 2003) that showed immediate expansion in its later years; it got to first place in terms of the number of stores (720) and sales of women's wear (34.2 billion roubles) in 2018. We shall look into the reason for its surprising progress in the future.
- ³³ For more details about the Russian textile and garment industry, see Fujiwara (2015, 2016).
- ³⁴ Fujiwara (2017).
- ³⁵ More precisely, chemical fibre was only counted in textile production statistics from 2009 and non-woven fabric from 2010.
- ³⁶ Website of the Ivanovo regional government (http://invest-ivanovo.ru/data/pr_04.pdf), accessed 2nd January 2017.
- ³⁷ According to Tsentr razvitiya VSHE, 60% of clothes come from abroad. *Vedomosti*, 7th September 2018, p. 15. This percentage also varies between sources.
- ³⁸ 'Industriya Mody', 2015, No. 2, p. 9.
- ³⁹ *RKB*, 1st June 2017.
- ⁴⁰ *Ekspert*, No. 22, 28th May 2018, pp. 22–23.
- ⁴¹ The production of Gloria Jeans can be seen on YouTube; 'Kak delayutsya dzinsy GJ' (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QF4F7eQINPs>), accessed 27th April 2019.
- ⁴² See *Ekonomika i zhizn'*, No. 28, 21st July 2017, p. 10.
- ⁴³ Romir, Kak rossiyanе otnosyatsya k vozmozhnomu zapretu na vvoz importnogo alkogolya, available at: <http://romir.ru/studies/kak-rossiyanе-otnovsyatsya-k-vozmozhnomu-zapretu-na-vvoz-importnogo-alkogolya>, accessed 27th April 2019. Based on online interviews with 2,000 people over 18 years old.
- ⁴⁴ Minpromtorg RF (2017) Strategiya razvitiya legkoi promyshlennosti v Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2025 goda, available at: <https://ivgpu.com/images/docs/nauka/dokumenty/strategiya-razvitiya-leg-prom.pdf>, accessed 27th April 2019.

- ⁴⁵ For example, a large amount of uniform orders was concentrated on the ‘BTK group’, which is owned by Bolloev, ex-president of the beer factory ‘Baltika’, who has a close relationship with President Putin. Fujiwara (2011).
- ⁴⁶ ‘This would probably be a problem of constructing local production or ordering with local companies.’ *Vedomosti*, 27th January 2017, p. 6.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁸ Bevins (2015).
- ⁴⁹ Gurova and Morozova (2018).
- ⁵⁰ Gurova et al. (2016).
- ⁵¹ For the characteristics of the behaviour and consciousness of the younger generations, see Vasyutina, Matraeva, and Korol’kova (2019); Shestakova (2016); Redaktsiya Yangspeis (2017).
- ⁵² The fact that several foreign companies are still attracted to the Russian market also proves Russian consumers’ attitude of supporting globalisation. For example, UNIQLO opened eight shops in Russia during 2018.

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